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RITU Project Work Package I: National Report on the UK

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Some data are still to be added – in section 5 on trade union responses (awaiting publication of TUC report), and in section 6, appendices.

1. The Specificity of 'Race' and Racism

The British approach to the concepts of race and racism differs from that of her European neighbours for a number of reasons. First, Britain's Black and ethnic minority population is a numerically significant (at present, eight percent of the total UK population)[1] and is largely a settled population, mostly with British citizenship. Today, the majority are British-born, and until very recently, most of the post-colonial migrants from Africa, the Caribbean and Asia already held formal British citizenship when they arrived. With formal political rights they did not have to fear deportation for their political actions. Formal citizenship was thus crucial for migrants' political participation (Kofman *et al* 2001). This is all the more true today, as the majority are British-born. Second, compared with some other European countries, Britain has had an important history of visible struggle against racism, including the ongoing history of resistance against racism since slavery and colonialism and a considerable Black feminist resistance This history is an important point of reference and source of knowledge of resistance against racism (Sivanandan 1991). Third, the 'empire' holds a fundamental place in British nationalism, not unlike other former imperial powers; unlike them, the 'trauma of de-colonisation' has been excluded from narrations of the nation in the post-colonial period (Smith 1994). The very absence of working through British colonial history is, however, mirrored in the construction of the post-colonial immigrants as the distinctive, racialised 'Other' which marks the boundaries of post-colonial Britishness (Mirza 1997, Hall 1992, Smith 1995, Ware 1992, Layton-Henry and Wilpert 1994).

Fourth, there is the dominance of the 'race relations paradigm'. Even though more than 60% of recent migrants are now categorised as 'non-visible minorities' (Morris 1997:254), and despite the complex ethnic and national compositions of both 'native' and 'immigrated' populations, a binary characterisation of inclusion and exclusion, the Black-White' dichotomy, remains dominant in this country. Recently, its inappropriateness has been increasingly brought into question, in particular following widespread and rampant racism against asylum seekers who do not easily fit with the pre-existing notion of Blackness (*Report of the Commission on the future of Multi-Ethnic Britain* 2000). However, most data collection or theorising on ethnicity still focus on post-colonial migrants and their descendants from the Caribbean, Asia and Africa. Thus, the Census, the Labour Force Survey and other large-scale surveys

[1] Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market: Final Report, Cabinet Office Strategy Unit, March 2003.

collect data on ethnic minorities through categories based on the differentiation between white and post-colonial black migrants.[2]

1.1 Significance of the 'immigrant', racism and xenophobia, and 'race relations'

The historical origins of the concepts and practices of race and racism and their link to the British empire, the ideology of industrialism ('neo-Darwinism, eugenics) and the rise of the imperialist state are covered more fully in section 2.1 below. In this section, we discuss the British conceptualisation of race and related topics, particularly as they are perceived within the community.

Despite highly complex ethnic and national compositions of both 'native' and 'immigrated' populations, a binary construction of belonging is prevalent in Britain, namely the *Black/White* (for critiques, cf. Aziz 1997, Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992, Radtke 1994). This is despite the fact that more than 60% of immigrants are categorised as 'non-visible minorities' (Morris 1997:254). More recently, this imbalance has been recognised, in particular with the emergence of widespread and rampant racism against asylum seekers who do not easily fit with the pre-existing notion of Blackness (cf. Kofman et al 2001: 39, *Report of the Commission on the future of Multi-Ethnic Britain* 2000). However, most data collection or theorising on ethnicity does not take so-called 'white' ethnic minorities into account adequately.

The British colonial legacy and the fact that many Black British people hold formal citizenship have led many authors to see a distinct model of incorporation compared to other European countries (cf. Rath 1993; Brubaker 1989). Most colonial immigrants hold formal citizenship and until 1981, birth on the territory facilitated automatic access to British citizenship (Dummett 1986). Together with multi-culturalist policies and institutions, such as specific anti-discrimination laws, official equal opportunities policies and official multi-culturalist policies in many institutions (cf. Braham, Rattansi, Skellington 1992) this has facilitated the political and social participation of ethnic minorities. These, of course, are important factors for the development of certain forms of agency. Recognition -even if partial- through state institutions has effects on the ways in which ethnic minority people can formulate demands on the state, claim resources, and access decision-making. The British multi-cultural model recognises a certain degree of cultural and ethnic difference. Ethnic community organisations are recognised as representatives of ethnic groups, and thus accorded participation in the formulation of social policy. This has made a difference in the incorporation of migrants, particularly refugees, since these organisations were responsible for their provisions. This has positive effects, such as a greater input of migrants and ethnic minority people into social policy and the formulation of specific social and cultural needs. At the same time, these multi-culturalist policies problematically reify static notions of culture. Moreover, there is a lack of democratic representativity and accountability of community organisations and their leadership. These factors also often lead to a reification of hierarchies and oppressions of ethnicity, gender and sexuality (cf. Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992, Kofman et al 2001, Sahgal and Yuval-Davis 1992). Existing multi-culturalist policies in Britain are however modelled on post-colonial 'Black and Asian' migrants and do not sufficiently respond to the needs of migrants from other countries who do not easily

[2] In 2001, the category of mixed race was also introduced.

fit within the race relatiosn paradigm. This is particularly the case for recent refugee populations (cf. Uguris 2001).

The development of multi-culturalist policies and anti-discrimination legislation was a response to Black and Asian anti-racist resistance. As most immigrants post-colonial migrants from Africa, the Caribbean and Asia hold formal citizenship in the UK they had all formal political rights and brought with them a history of anti-colonial struggles. Postcolonial migrants organised in various forms to counter the worst effects of racism in housing, education and other areas, as well as building community resources and constructing new forms of ethnic and cultural identity. This underlines the fact that formal citizenship remains crucial for migrants' political participation (cf. Kofman et al 2001, Layton-Henry 1991), as well as the significance of building on the important symbolic points of reference of anti-colonialist struggles as a source of knowledge of resistance against racism.

The race relations paradigm has for a long time dominated the social sciences and social policy. Some approaches within the race relations paradigm did acknowledge structural discrimination, and racism. However, racism was not recognised as a pervasive phenomenon that structured the whole society and construction of the nation (for a critique, Gilroy 1987). Racism was reduced to economic exploitation and discrimination in education, the labour and housing markets (cf. Rex 1994) and the Black and Asian population constructed as an underclass (e.g. Rex 1988). These discourses promoted strategies of mutual understanding and cultuiral exchange to counter racism (cf. Brah 1996). Owing largely to the interventions of Black and ethnic minority academics and activists, there are diverse theorisations of and strategies against racism, so that the race relations or multi-culturalist approaches are challenged from a wide range of positions (for critical interventions e.g. Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992, Brah 1996, CCCS 1982, Gilroy 1987, Miles 1989, Phizacklea and Miles 1980, Phizacklea 1983, Sivanandan 1982).

The concept 'good race relations' misses out the complex and shifting hierarchisation of different ethnic groups. Moreover, it accepts the categories of race as givens, the groups thus designated appear to be unproblematically assignable. The shifts in the construction of ethnic groups, such as the different meanings of the category 'Black' cannot be recognised and accounted for (Anthias 1992). The focus of politics based on these paradigms is the promotion of 'good race relations': this calls on the Other to integrate, to adapt to the norms of the 'host society', while the dominant populations are called upon to be tolerant. The basic premise of (white) 'Britishness' as the national norm is not questioned (Gilroy 1987). Of course, a strong critique of such approaches has also developed (e.g. CCCS 1982, Gilroy 1987, 1987a; Sivanandan 1990). It has been recognised that racism is already inscribed in the equation of nation, ethnicity and race. For racism to be challenged, it is also necessary to challenge the construction of whiteness and the homogenisation of both, the dominant and the subjected groups (cf. Mirza 1997).

2. Historical Evolution

2.1 The Mid 19th century to World War I

Having overcome many of the dislocations caused by industrialisation, Britain was, by the mid 19th century, able to reap the benefits of being the pioneer. She was literally ‘the workshop of the world’ dominating all markets accessible to the penetration of her manufactured goods. The role of Britain’s colonies, having laid the foundations of merchant capital and contributed directly to industrial take-off (raw cotton worked by slaves); was now called into question. In the 1850's and 1860's many prominent politicians following the free trade, laissez-faire line of the Colonial Reform Society had argued for a freer relationship between Britain and the Empire, by the last quarter of the nineteenth century the tune had changed. Benjamin Disraeli's attitude mirrors this change precisely. In 1852 he referred in a speech at the Crystal Palace, to 'these dammed colonies' being 'millstones round our neck'. This pre-1870 approach was not motivated by a liberal or humanitarian concern for the colonised. It simply reflected the fact that in the absence of serious rivalry from any other Great Power, the objective of the colonial 'reformers' was to incur the minimum possible adminstrative and military expense without jeopardizing Britain's economic domination. Certainly no colonies were relinquished in this period and any attempt at self-determination was brutally repressed, as in the case of India in 1857.

After 1870, faced with the loss of her markets in Europe and America, Britain became increasingly reliant on her colonial empire. From this time onwards British policy was dominated by the twin imperatives of ever tighter control of existing colonies and the relentless drive to conquer and annex new ones. She was not alone in this objective - the drive for protected markets propelled other European countries on the same course, leading to the aggressive Imperialism, bolstered by the new nationalism, which characterised the last quarter of the 19th and the early 20th centuries. This resulted in many 'small' wars between the colonisers and the colonised and heightened international tension between the colonising 'great' (and not so great powers- e.g. Italy, Belgium) culminating in World War One. Britain, though in this field if no other, maintained her early lead! By 1914 the total of British colonial territory amounted to some 12.7 million square miles (in Asia, Africa, the far and near east and Europe [i.e. Ireland]).

Imperial ideology, eugenics and racism

In an atmosphere of heightened national and racial chauvinism, imperialism was able, through the skilful use of popular culture, to employ an ideology and practice with outspokenly racist overtones. Undoubtedly the effect of this was to make it much harder for a comparatively weak socialist movement to gain much ground. Preoccupation with race was allied to the fear of the re-emergence of a class conscious socialist movement in the 1880's which threatened to divert the masses away from the ‘national interest’- a chauvinistic construct which was widely employed by all European countries in defence of their competing trading and imperial preoccupation. Now the Empire and its benefits in the form of social imperialism, provided the unifying antidote to the emerging socialist consciousness of the 1880's which threatened to expose the possible class conflict of a declining economy. Social imperialism, a term first used by the Austrian Marxist, Karl Renner in 1917, was summed up by Disraeli's famous dictum, "sanitas et imperium" - which meant that the profits from the Empire could be used in part to finance social reform. It was recognised that a mass electorate could not be wooed by self help alone. Imperial expansion, which of itself demanded popular support, if only to provide

soldiers to conquer new colonies and defend existing ones from rival imperialisms, could play a key role in winning votes for either of the two parties if it was linked materially to social betterment. The writings of all the major imperialist statesmen, Joseph Chamberlain, Cecil Rhodes, Viscount Milner (to name but a few), all made this connection.

The ideology of racism had underpinned slavery and hence was not a new phenomenon. In the period of imperialist expansion, however, it was dressed up in a new pseudo-scientific garb and given a populist mass appeal. There was ample opportunity to disseminate the ideology given that the last quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed a great expansion, formally and informally, of the ideological apparatus of the state, which was both prompted and facilitated by the rise in literacy. This provided a wider platform for the volumes of ‘scholarly’ writings attempting to provide some kind of intellectual justification of British racial superiority. Hitler was later to draw upon the writing of the British white supremacists of this era. Men like Benjamin Kidd and Karl Pearson subverted Darwin's theory of evolution by crudely using his ideas on the 'survival of the fittest' and applying them to the struggle between races. Despite the finer points of ‘theory’ which divided the two men, their central concern, born out of England’s declining economic position as a world power, was the question of the national ‘struggle for existence’, which for them was synonymous with racial superiority. According to Pearson the black races had already lost out in this struggle, having been conquered by the whites, hence proving the racial superiority of the conqueror. In order to prove this he created the new subject of biometrics - statistical biology. Pearson associated himself with the biologist, Francis Galton, a cousin of Charles Darwin and Professor of 'eugenics' at London University. Galton discovered this new 'science' of eugenics, the practical application of which could, by means of selective breeding, regulate heredity and produce a super (white) race, capable of surviving the struggle for existence.[3] Eugenics became an established and virtually unquestioned orthodoxy. It was allied to the prevalent fear that the survival of the imperial super race was jeopardised by two problems. Firstly the decline in the birth rate which had fallen steadily, especially among the middle class, since the 1880's and secondly the ‘degenerated’ condition of the masses. [4]

Labour movement policies on empire and race up to 1918

A surprising array of pro-imperialists appeared as opinion formers on the intellectual left. The non-Marxist Fabian Society, formed in 1884 (the 'think-tank' of reformism and later of the Labour right wing), was aggressively pro-imperialist. Its classic text on the subject, *Fabianism and the Empire*, drafted by Bernard Shaw and published in 1900, could have been written by Cecil Rhodes or Joseph Chamberlain. For the Fabians, the Empire provided the means of accomplishing the social reforms they consistently championed and it led them, not in the direction of labour independence but rather towards political unity with all those who wanted to promote the 'national interest', as opposed to sectional or class interests. Many of them, like HG Wells and Shaw himself were outspokenly racist, and accepted without question the prevalent white supremacist ideology. Hence they were the prime movers behind a project to form a new party of 'National Efficiency. This was not a political party in the accepted

[3] For a full discussion of this see Bernard Semmel Imperialism and Social Reform (1960)
[4] This eugenic fear was realised when, in 1899, so many working class Boer war recruits were rejected as medically unfit.

sense, but rather a cross- party 'brains trust' initiated by the Fabians (notably Sidney and Beatrice Webb), consisting of leading Liberal and Tory imperialists to discuss the "aims and methods of Imperial policy".

The attitude of the mainstream labour movement leadership to the Empire was at best silent on the issue and at worst aggressively pro-imperialist. The partition of Africa appeared to escape the notice of the TUC. Its only comment on the enslavement of India was a resolution asking for factory legislation to be introduced in the subcontinent. In 1899 the TUC 'took note' of the Boer War. The 1901 TUC Congress decided to support the war and in 1902 it criticised the government for its 'clumsy handling' of the issue. Such examples, multiplied as the century progressed, were not simply aberrations, but were indicative of an uncritical acceptance of Britain's imperial project.

The record of the 'Marxist' left was little better. The Boer war and later World War One were testing grounds and turning points for the left wing of the labour movement. The leader of the Social Democratic Federation, H.M.Hyndman, opposed the Boer War (1899-1901), as did the Independent Labour Party (founded in 1893). However, their grounds for opposition had nothing to do with any recognition of the interests of the indigenous black population. Their pro-Boer sentiment was based on their dislike of 'Rand capitalists' who were frequently referred to as 'financial Jews'.

Later Hyndman and Robert Blatchford (editor of the popular socialist paper, *The Clarion*) became ardent supporters of Britain's 'big navy' programme - the policy of increasing naval expenditure to protect the Empire from rival European imperialism. Hyndman's views did not reflect the majority opinion within his own party, but the fact that he, as its leader, articulated them, meant that valuable time and energy was spent waging an internal struggle rather than in conducting an anti-imperialist crusade.

2.2 The early 20th century to the Second World War

Anti-semitism

Anti-semitism was a powerful current in left circles. In 1904-5 parliament debated the Aliens Immigration Bill introduced by the Balfour government to curb Jewish immigrants fleeing persecution from Tsarist Russia. The ILP issued a pamphlet dealing with this issue.[5] Its author, H.Snell, argued that the government's stance was hypocritical since it had approved of foreign immigration to South Africa, but took a different stand when it came to Britain thereby reversing a fine tradition. However, Snell drew the line at Jews, rich or poor. In language prefiguring the Nazis, Snell argued that the alien problem was in the main a Jewish problem. 'Let him go where he will, the Jew is always an alien, and against his race there exists a prejudice that corrupts all gentile reasoning.[6]

The inter war years

[5].The Foreigner in England-an Examination of the Problem of Alien Immigration, ILP Tracts for the Times no.4.

[6].The Foreigner in England-an Examination of the Problem of Alien Immigration p.4

The Versailles settlement divided German colonies between France and Britain. The British Empire was territorially at its largest in the inter-war years. This was accompanied by 'empire strengthening' strategies (Barbara Bush[7]). Cultural imperialism found new outlets in film and radio and it can be argued that, despite Britain's post-war economic difficulties, the inter war years witnessed a truly hegemonic triumph of already well entrenched imperial and racial ideology. The inter-war years saw the beginnings of greater labour movement interest in colonial issues. This did not betoken a more enlightened attitude to race as the silence of the labour movement on the racial attacks suffered by black Britons (especially seamen) in the 1920's showed. Interest in the colonies in this period was in the main motivated by two concerns. Firstly the fear that the British Empire (now hugely expanded as a result of the First World War peace treaties) might be lost due to the rise of national liberation movements in many of the colonies. Secondly, the perceived threat of Bolshevism (in the form of the Comintern), especially given the latter's involvement in the anti-imperialist struggle. Zinoviev's anti- imperialism concentrated particular invective against British imperialism. In the light of this it was necessary for the Labour Party (and especially because it was a party of government in 1924) to pay more attention to colonial policy- such policy slowly evolved.

Labour party colonial policy[8]

In 1918 the Labour Party published its manifesto *Labour and the New Social Order,* written by Sidney Webb. It said that the Empire was of special concern due to Britain's responsibility to 'non adult races'(white man's burden theme). It called for greater democracy in the empire where there was a demand for independence. But it did not advocate the abandonment of the Empire, rather its strengthening through a newly created Britannic Alliance. Thus it was that, for the first time, Labour sought to develop its colonial policy. The main mechanism for so doing was via the establishment in 1924 of the Imperial Affairs sub Committee (later Imperial Advisory Committee): its secretary was Leonard Woolf. However, despite a more pro-active policy, as manifested by the 1925 First British Commonwealth and Labour Conference, the tide of anti- British feeling was manifest in the colonies. The Labour Party clearly recognised this. It explains the publication in 1933 of its policy statement: *The Colonial Empire.* This recognised the fact of independence struggles- but made distinction between India (and South East Asia), Africa and Caribbean.

This distinction was to persist in Labour thinking - India was written off as a colony because of the strength of its independence movement and the strong communist influence. But it was hoped to delay independence at best or at worst retain influence post independence by ensuring that as far as possible the British constitutional model was adopted. South East Asia also regarded as very prone to communist influence. The Caribbean was viewed by Labour as very promising area (for imperialism) since despite the fact that trade unionism was stirring, it was thought that communist influence weak. Labour's strategic 'line' on Africa was more fully expressed in its 1943 pamphlet, *The Colonies.* It took the traditional racist line that Britain's African colonies were inhabited by 'backward peoples of primitive culture', whose economic and political systems are so backward that they are 'not yet able to stand by

[7] Imperialism, Race & Resistance, 1999.
[8]. Marjorie Nicholson Papers Box 19

themselves'. The conclusion drawn from this was that British rule had to be maintained 'as a trust for the native inhabitants'[9] until such time as the natives could be trained to govern themselves. This was, of course little different from the classic 19th century 'white man's burden' justification for the maintenance of empire.

TUC colonial policy

It was not until the 1930's that the TUC began to develop its colonial policy. Even then this was not a product of democratic discussion within the trade movement, rather as Marjorie Nicholson observes 'All TUC colonial work was done on the initiative of a few men at the top'[10]. It was obviously greatly influenced by government policy since the colonial office dates 'the first impetus to colonial trade unions' to the Passfield despatch in 1930[11]

In 1937 the TUC established a new committee - the Colonial Advisory Committee (CAC). Its secretary, WB.Kemmis was the TUC's first colonial specialist. Preliminary preparation of data for the committee's work was 'greatly facilitated by the courtesy of the Colonial Office'. The CAC dealt with all British colonies, excluding India. (India was the purview of the TUC's International committee). Because at first their detailed knowledge of the colonies was so scant, the CAC sought advice from the International African Service Bureau- an organisation formed in 1937 from a remarkable group of Pan-Africanists resident as exiles in London. These included Ras Makonnen, C.L.R.James, Jomo Kenyatta, I.T.A Wallace Johnson and George Padmore.[12] These men were revolutionary marxists, and after being warned off by the Labour Party, which regarded the IASB as a suspect organisation, the TUC dropped the contact. This in effect meant that both the TUC and the Labour Party were determined to hold anti-imperialist activists at arm's length. The fact that the CAC included Labour Party 'specialist' advisors like Creech-Jones (later to become Colonial Secretary), meant that from the outset the policies of the two organisations would be harmonised.

In 1938 the TUC formulated its demand for the appointment of 'labour advisors' to be sent to British colonies in order to assist the development of trade unionism on the British model. The impetus for this arose from government enquiries into the struggles of trade unionists (operating in conditions of illegality) in the Caribbean which resulted, in the 1930's, in a wave of labour unrest 'far more widespread and intense than anything that had preceded'[13]. The publication in 1938 of the Forster report on *Labour Disturbances in Trinidad* led to CAC s main demand for trade union advisors, while the appointment of Walter Citrine (TUC General Secretary

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[9]. The Colonies, 1943, MNP Box 19
[10]. Marjorie Nicholson The TUC Overseas, Allen & Unwin, 1986
[11] Trade Unionism in the Colonies ',Colonial Office Memorandum 1950, MN papers 932.5/3.
[12].The IASB itself was a product of the Ethiopian solidarity movement, being an outgrowth of International African Friends of Abyssinia group. The IASB lasted for seven years, until 1944. It was the longest surviving of all the pan African associations formed during this period. It merged, in 1944 with the Pan African Federation, the organisation which was largely responsible for the convening of the 1945 Pan African Congress. The motto of the IASB was 'educate, co-operate, emancipate- neutral in nothing affecting the African people'.
[13]. Richard Hart British policies in relation to labour in the colonies of the Caribbean, Communist Review no.30, Autumn 1999.

1926-46) as a member of West Indies Royal Commission (Moyne Commission) undoubtedly stimulated greater TUC awareness of colonial issues.

2.3 The Second World War to the 1950s

By 1940 the entry of the Labour Party into the Coalition government meant that TUC influence on official thinking on colonial (and other) matters was much greater. The 1940 Colonial Development & Welfare Act encouraged the spread of Trade Unionism in the colonies by legalising trade unions and encouraging their development, and secondly by appointing colonial trade union advisors to ensure that such unions were established on the right lines. TUC policy, it would seem, had come of age.

The first two colonial trade union advisors had been appointed by the following year - one for Trinidad and one for the Gold Coast and many more were planned. According to Jack Woddis (Head of the Communist Party's International Department)[14] by 1954 they operated in 15 colonies with a total staff of 400. Again TUC influence was in evidence in the newly established (1942) Colonial Labour Advisory Committee. This was a government body containing TUC nominees (they were not regarded as representatives of the TUC- official TUC views continued to be made direct to the colonial office). Its chief importance according to Marjorie Nicholson was that its existence gave the final stamp of authority to the policies of using TUC advice and positively encouraging the growth of trade unions [15]

The first majority Labour Government pursued the traditional line of the Colonial Office- apart from India, only Israel, Burma and Ceylon won their independence during the life of the Labour government. ('Won' being the operative word- nothing was 'granted'). Labour did as much as it could to preserve the Empire and if it could not it concentrated all its effort on ensuring the post colonial world was still safe for the capitalism. In general the policy was to head off the independence movements in the colonies by granting reform - in this sense Labour is regarded as being enlightened, but in fact the roots of this policy were laid before world war two. After the war, the key to the implementation of Labour's policy of killing colonial independence by kindness was through the agency of the Trade Union Congress (TUC).

The Western attitude to race and empire changed from racial confidence in hey day of imperialism, to racial fear in the period of de-colonisation (Furedi[16]). World War Two was the catalyst for change - thereafter an apparently more tolerant attitude to race was perceptible. This was due to the cold war fears of USSR and its support of liberation struggles. Poor conditions, lack of democracy and racism in the colonies could be perceived as a weak point in the liberal democratic armoury. Race was now identified as a potentially de-stabilising element in the international order.[17]

Race was also seen as a de-stabilising element in the domestic order for those countries (e.g. the USA) with large black populations. This was also becoming a factor in Britain due to the 1948 wave of immigration and the fact that no restrictions

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[14]. Jack Woddis The Mask is Off , Thames Publications, 1954.
[15]. The TUC Overseas, p.213.
[16]. Frank Furedi, The Silent War, Pluto, 1998.
[17]. Ibid.

were placed on immigration until 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act. Despite the small scale of the ‘wave’, this period witnessed, nonetheless, the beginnings (or possibly the continuation) of a very racialised debate which focussed on supposed social problems of having too many blacks with an alien culture settling in Britain.[18] Trade Unions, as in the 1920's were part of this ‘racialised debate’ in that they attempted to restrict immigrant labour even during periods of full employment[19]. Although the full debate on black immigration to Britain did not surface until mid 1960's, Solomos rejects notion that 1945-62 was an ‘age of innocence’ on race and immigration.

The appointment of Creech Jones as Secretary of State for the Colonies is conventionally regarded as signalising an apparently more liberal attitude to the colonies. Labour colonial policy 1945-51 was primarily motivated by fear that grievances among colonial peoples could be ‘exploited’ by communists. Hence, whilst not motivated by anti-imperialist sentiment, Labour policy recognised that reform was necessary. One of the key features of the reform programme was to permit the development of non-militant trade unionism. This, together with labour legislation, was regarded as both a vital in its own right, but also as a measure of social control which, especially during the cold war in the years following the establishment of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) was regarded as a vital means of safeguarding British colonial investments whether direct British rule survived or not.

This is reflected in TUC policy and practice which, encouraged by a government which saw trade unionism as central to its colonial policy, was now pursued with great vigour. The Colonial Office expressed it thus: ‘It is clear that the British TUC is capable of exercising an important and formative influence on the trade unions of the colonies’ (*Trade unionism in the British Colonies:* Colonial Office Memorandum 14 Oct 1950)[20] The same memorandum went on to say that because of suspicion of government bodies by the indigenous population in the colonies, the TUC’s role would be particularly important because ‘more than any official body, (it) can build up understanding and faith in this country’s aims’[21] The newly established ICFTU, which the TUC had joined in 1949[22] was regarded warmly by the Colonial Office because it would play a more direct part in combating communism than the TUC[23]

The TUC was firmly committed to an anti-communist line anyway. It published 3 pamphlets on the subject, 2 written in 1949, *Defend Democracy* and T*actics of disruption* and the 3rd in 1953, *The TUC & Communism*. This line also induced vehement opposition to the Movement for Colonial Freedom, founded in 1954 to campaign for Asian and African independence. The TUC went ahead pursuing what

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[18].John Solomos The Politics of Immigration since 1945 (in A.Phizacklea & R.Miles The British Trade Union Movement & Racism (in Braham, Rattanzi & Skellington, Racism and Anti Racism, Sage 1992).
[19].A.Phizacklea & R.Miles The British Trade Union Movement & Racism (in Braham, Rattanzi & Skellington, Racism and Anti Racism, Sage 1992).
[20]. Marjorie Nicholson Papers, 932, box 14.
[21]. Colonial Office memorandum, 14th October 1950.
[22]. The TUC had initially affiliated to the World Federation of Trade Unions when it was established in 1945, but left in 1948 in response to Cold War pressures and was one of the founders of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions in 1949.
[23]. C.O memorandum op.cit.

in practice turned out to be a somewhat contradictory policy. On the one hand, with government backing, it was busily encouraging the development of trade unions via its colonial labour advisors (and as the Fabian, Walter Bowen said, doing what no other government in Europe had ever done[24]), but on the other hand it lamented the capability of the native worker ever to truly comprehend the principles of trade unionism. Reports of the trade union advisors frequently criticised the home grown colonial trade unions- accusing their leaders of being venal, inexperienced, corrupt or too political. Handbooks and Guides were frequently issued by labour advisors to show the colonials the error of their ways and suggest alternatives.

It is clear that TUC mirrored and supported that of the government, especially Labour governments, or those with labour ministers (e.g. during WW2). But what of the period after 1951 – one of uninterrupted Tory rule until 1964. The colonial office, under a conservative administration, now pursued a different line on trade union matters for 2 major policy reasons: 'the wind of change' (Macmillan) realism approach to colonial independence: i.e. the acceptance of the end of the British Empire and its replacement with a much smaller British Commonwealth recognition of and submission to US post war worldwide hegemony. The change was clearly spelled out in conclusion of 1955 in the *Report of the East Africa Royal Commission* which stated that: 'the attempt to encourage the growth of trade unions on the British model is likely, for some time to come, to represent an expenditure of effort which might be employed more effectively in other directions.' The TUC could not accept this conclusion.[25] By 1956 it was clear that the influence of the Colonial Office was contracting. It no longer wished to employ colonial labour advisors, and suggested that the TUC might wish to carry out this function alone

TUC colonial policy was a very late development, and in common with the Labour Party, was never anti-imperialist. Whatever the rhetoric about the desire for colonial self government, very little was forthcoming during the period of the Third Labour Government. Implicit racist thinking, overtly nurtured in the previous 70 or so years, continued to influence the labour movement's views. The use of trade unionism to discourage the development of a pro-communist political movement which might take advantage of the very delayed voting rights granted in most colonies after 1945 was partially successful. Where it did not deliver compliance, the movement was crushed as in the Malayan Federation and in Kenya. But for the most part, British inspired trade unionism, working with the Colonial Office and through trade union labour advisors, began to take hold. Supplemented by a major programme of government funded trade union education and later by the resources of the ICFTU, the colonial world was left safe for neo colonialism once independence had been won. The groundwork had been thoroughly prepared in this period.

2.4 The 1950s and 1960s

In the wake of so-called Notting Hill 'race riots' in 1958, where white people attacked blacks, politicians argued that the presence and continued immigration of 'coloured' people represented a threat to the rule of law, thus blaming the victims of the attacks. Under the Conservatives the 1962 Commonwealth Immigrants Act for the first time

[24]. Walter Bowen Colonial Trade Unionism, Fabian Society 1954.

[25] CAC 19th October 1955 MNC 932.9

introduced immigration controls for British subjects. Under the new rules, only holders of a UK passport could enter unrestricted, while a voucher system was introduced for all other British subjects: Category A vouchers for those with a specific job to go to, Category B vouchers for those with specific, recognized skills in short supply, Category C vouchers in limited numbers for all others were issued on a first come, first served basis. Although there was no mention of 'race' in the Act, the term 'Commonwealth immigrants' became a code for black migrants. A minister at the time recalls that 'restrictions were applied to coloured and white citizens in all Commonwealth countries – though everybody recognised that immigration from Canada, Australia and New Zealand formed no part of the problem' (Deedes in Solomos 1992: 50). Once the voucher system was introduced, there followed calls to cut back the number of vouchers issued. There was a fall from 30,130 vouchers in 1963 to 2,290 in 1972, after which the system was abolished. The gender bias of the 1962 Act should also be noted. After much discussion in Parliament, a clause was introduced whereby immigrant men were allowed to bring their wives but not vice versa. This was justified on the grounds that the husband determined the domicile of a family and that men posed a greater threat to the labour market than women (Bhabha and Shutter 1994).[26]

The 1962 Act retained a right of settlement for those with passports issued in the UK, among them East African Asians from Kenya and Uganda who entered Britain from 1965-67 in a steady flow. When in 1967/68, Kenyan government policies threatened the livelihoods of its Asian citizens, many of whom were entitled to migrate to Britain, a wave of anti-immigrant agitation followed. This involved London dockers striking and demonstrating in support of a populist racist Conservative Party politician, Enoch Powell. In response, a second Commonwealth Immigrants Act was passed in 1968. 'Under the new law any citizen of the United Kingdom or colonies, who was the holder of passport issued by the UK Government was subject to immigration control unless they or at least one parent or grandparent was born, adopted, naturalised or registered as a citizen of the United Kingdom and colonies in the UK.' (Solomos 1989:54). This became known as the 'patriality rule'. Although 'race' is not mentioned explicitly, the timing of the rule was designed in such a way that 'vast majority of British citizens, free from immigration control are white people' (Dummett 1986:146).

A new Conservative government then restricted still further the immigration from the New Commonwealth (Caribbean, India, Pakistan, Bangladesh) in the 1971 Immigration Act. It meant that except for patrials, anyone wishing to migrate to Britain - whether Commonwealth citizens or aliens - needed a work permit. These work permits were issued for twelve months and tied to a specific employer. Permission to change employer had to be granted by the Department of Employment and was not automatic. Permit holders were liable to deportation if they breached the conditions of the permit or became 'undesirable'. This last provision made many permit holders cautious about challenging poor and exploitative working conditions or becoming active in trade unions or political organisations. The work permits were renewable and after four years, the holder could apply to have the time limit and conditions lifted.

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[26] However, between 1963 and 1972 vouchers issued to New Commonwealth women made up 20% of the total and almost half of all non-Commonwealth workers; in the 1970s, nearly a third of workers who obtained workpermits were women (Bhabha and Shutter 1994: 38).

2.5 The 1970s to 1990s

The main provisions of the 1971 Immigration Act remain valid today, although the majority of work permits are now issued to professional people from non-Commonwealth countries. The 1971 Act effectively put an end to all primary migration from the New Commonwealth. With the exception of the admission of Ugandan Asians in 1972, the only migration permitted from the New Commonwealth was on the basis of family reunification. Thus, the British system of migrant labour came to resemble much more those in other European countries. However, the rules and practice for family reunification still did not allow women migrants to bring their husbands and children. Under the immigration rules women were still seen as dependents.

The Nationality Act passed by the Thatcher government in 1981 changed the status of patrials into that of British citizens and created two further categories: British Dependent Territories Citizenship and British Overseas Citizenship. These 'citizens' had no right to settle in Britain, although a limited number of Hong Kong citizens were made an exception. The Act also changed the rules for children born in the UK of non-British parents who were no longer automatically allowed to acquire British citizenship.

The Rise of 'Equal Opportunities' Policies

In parallel to the development of immigration policy and legislation, successive governments began to develop policies to address the problems of racism (although not usually referred to as such) and discrimination against immigrants and their descendents in Britain. The first Race Relations Act (1965) focused on direct discrimination, particularly in services and in access to public places, and penalised incitement to racial hatred (Cabinet Office 2003). The second Act (1968) extended the provisions to cover discrimination in housing and established the Community Relations Commission. The third Act, passed by a Labour government in 1976, covered substantially new ground and was a sign of the growing public recognition of the extent of racial discrimination in the country. It superseded and extended the scopes of the two previous Acts against discrimination in employment, training and education, housing and the provision of goods, facilities, services and planning. It rendered unlawful inducing any person to discriminate against others on racial grounds. In this law, 'racial grounds' means on the grounds of colour, 'race', nationality or ethnic or national origins. However, the law explicitly forbade 'positive discrimination', that is discrimination in favour of a person of a minority ethnic group.

Most importantly, the 1976 Act outlawed both direct and discrimination in private businesses. 'Direct discrimination' was defined as the less favourable treatment of a person due to their race. 'Indirect discrimination' was defined as occurring "where an apparently (race) neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular disadvantage compared with other persons…" (Race Relations Act 1976, cited in Cabinet Office 2003). Moreover, the Act enabled victims of discrimination to bring proceedings to tribunals. Most complaints were in relation to employment. The complainant had direct access to Industrial Tribunals, which had the power to require the respondent to pay compensation, or recommend a particular

course of action to eliminate the adverse effects of discrimination, for example the reinstatement or promotion of the complainant.

The Race Relations Act also established an independent Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). This replaced the earlier institutions of a Race Relations Board and Community Relations Commission. The CRE, which still exists today, is technically independent of the government despite being funded by it and having its board members approved by the government. Its statutory duties are to work towards the elimination of racial discrimination, to promote equality of opportunity and good relations between persons of different racial backgrounds and to keep the operation of the Act under review and to make such recommendations for amending it. The CRE has a law enforcement function and can and does conduct formal investigations.

The emergence of equal opportunities policies in British firms in the 1980s and 1990s may be viewed as a compromise between business interests and the interests of those disadvantaged in the labour market. Gibbon (1992) identified three main factors: the increase in lobbying and campaigning by ethnic minorities, women, lesbians and gays and the disabled; the Conservative government policy that preferred business-led solutions to disadvantage to state-led ones; and the policy shift by the CRE and the Equal Opportunities Commission away from demanding social justice and tougher legislation to forming governmental-business consensus that discrimination affects the disadvantaged as well as optimising human resources. Gibbon's study of Equal Opportunity Employers in Sheffield, however, found that there was little relation between organizations having a developed and implemented EOP and stimulating change in employment outcomes in the short term. Organizations that did improve the recruitment records for black people did so largely through political employment decisions. Yet such policies may also have other indirect positive effects, as they often serve as a platform for further mobilisation of black and women workers. (Discrimination in the labour market is covered in part 4 below.)

The Rise of 'Asylum' Policy

In the early 1980s, the image of asylum seekers was that of brave people fleeing persecution, but this changed in the mid-1980s with the arrival of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka who were portrayed as bogus, as at the time single young men from South Asia were the main targets of immigration controls. During the 1990s, the political focus shifted to generalise disbelief about the status of asylum seekers. The numbers of asylum seekers in the UK grew from 26,205 in 1990, to 80,315 in 2000 (Matz et al 2001). Despite research findings to the contrary (as in Robins and Segrott 2002), successive governments assume that welfare provision represent a pull-factor attracting asylum seekers to Britain. Therefore, during the 1990s, a number of legislative and policy measures have aimed at making Britain unattractive to asylum seekers. The 1996 Asylum and Immigration Act was the first in a series of measures to cut down on the rights of asylum seekers to social benefits, including housing and employment. The media reports on asylum seekers contributed strongly to the racist image of the bogus asylum seeker, entering Britain to abuse the welfare system. Other deterrent measures against asylum seekers included the detention under immigration laws for an indefinite period, without judicial supervision. The UN Working Party on Arbitrary Detention characterised the UK detention system as arbitrary and in breach

of international human rights standards in 1998 (Report on the future of multi-ethnic Britain 2000).

2.6 Recent Developments

Following the murder of the black teenager, Stephen Lawrence, in 1993, a major debate around race and racism in Britain emerged, leading to a full judicial enquiry under Lord Macpherson. The Macpherson Inquiry found that the Metropolitan police's handling of the investigation 'was marred by a combination of professional incompetence, institutional racism and the failure of leadership by senior officers' (Hall 1999: 187). In his report, Lord Macpherson strongly condemned a culture of institutional racism throughout British institutions and public life, identifying it as going beyond both direct and indirect racial discrimination. He defined institutional racism as: 'The failure of a organisation to provide an appropriate and professional service to people because of their colour, culture or ethnic origin. It can be detected in processes, attitudes and behaviours which amount to discrimination through unwitting prejudice, ignorance, thoughtlessness and racist stereotyping which disadvantage minority ethnic people.' (Macpherson. 1999. para. 6.34) This definition sparked a debate and reflection within public bodies (such as the police force and armed services) and throughout British society, including the trade union movement. The Macpherson Report brought to the agenda of the British public the extent of discrimination against members of ethnic minorities and led to major new legislation.

In 2000 the Race Relations Amendment Act strengthened the provisions of the 1976 Act in a number of ways. It extended its application to the police and to certain other public bodies, which had previously been exempt. The new Act made Chief Police Officers liable for acts of discrimination by officers under their control, allowed complaints of racial discrimination to be heard in certain immigration decisions, and prohibited discrimination by ministers or government in appointments and limits the circumstances in which 'safeguarding national security' can be used to justify discrimination. (One exception to the Act is that it will still be lawful to discriminate on the grounds of nationality or ethnic or national origin in immigration and nationality decisions, but not on 'race' or colour.)

Most important, the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000 places a positive duty on public authorities to promote equality of opportunity and good race relations. This duty will now be enforceable by the Commission for Racial Equality. Public authorities will have to consider the implications for racial equality of all their policies of employment and service provision. This includes monitoring their staff by ethnicity, assessing the impact on racial equality of existing and proposed policies and practice (CRE 2000). The CRE may also issue codes of practice, as well as give advice to employers, trade unions, employees, staff organisations and employment agencies.

The Race Relations Amendment Act also has provisions for facilitative actions, which enable training providers and employers to take a range of positive action measures to help members of racial groups underrepresented in particular work to access training provisions to overcome previously enshrined disadvantages. However, the Act clearly states, that while training provision can focus on particular ethnic and racial groups,

employment decisions cannot be made to ‘positively discriminate’. Likewise, quotas for ethnic minority applicants, as they exist in the US, are not lawful in the UK.

Further Developments in Asylum Policy

The area of asylum policy is in constant flux, and new measures are continually being introduced, tested, extended or abolished. One of these was the voucher system, introduced in 2000, under which asylum seekers did not receive cash benefits, but vouchers enabling them to shop only in specific outlets and labelling them. After sustained campaigns (including pressure from that year’s TUC president, the influential black trade union leader and general secretary of the TGWU, Bill Morris) pointing to their discriminatory nature and showing that asylum seekers lost out on their benefits, the system was abolished in 2002.

The politicisation of asylum became obvious with the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, which devotes large sections to the question of asylum seekers and refugees. Since July 2002, asylum applicants are not allowed to work, regardless of the duration of their application procedure. The Government justified this policy on the basis that most asylum decisions would be made in less than six months and based its view on the argument that ‘easy’ access to employment acts as a ‘pull factor.’ Furthermore, immigration officers will have new powers to enter business premises without a warrant to check out undocumented workers. Accommodation centres are to house refugees in non-urban areas, with children’s education and some health care provision provided on-site. Separate schooling of asylum seekers’ children will inhibit successful integration and the isolated location of the accommodation centres will make it more difficult for asylum seekers as a whole to interact and get to know British society. Moreover, many asylum seekers applying from within Britain will not be eligible for social security services, thus making them destitute and often homeless. These measures are likely in the long term have a negative effect on integration.

3. Contemporary Racism and Anti-Racism

3.1 Contemporary Racism

New forms of racism have become prominent over the last decade. Two important cases are Islamophobia and racism against asylum seekers. With the Salman Rushdie affair of the late 1980s, the presence of British Muslims became more politicised. It is estimated that there are between 1.2 and 1.5 million Muslims, including nominal and actively practicing (Report on the future of Multiethnic Britain 2000: para 17.2). Through the 1990s with an increasing international climate of the demonisation of Islam and Muslim countries as the Other of the New World Order, anti-Muslim racism became more pronounced in Britain, too. Meanwhile, British Muslims became more articulate and campaigned for the inclusion of Muslims into Race Relations law (only Jews and Sikhs were recognised as ethnic groups for the purposes of the legislation). In December 2001 an amendment was made, as a consequence of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. UK law now refers to offences that are 'racially or religiously aggravated'. In addition, many public bodies have included religion as one factor in their anti-discrimination policies and the European Employment Directive requires member states to introduce legislation prohibiting direct and indirect discrimination and harassment on the

ground of religion or belief in the areas of employment, self-employment, occupation and vocational training. However, especially in the wake of September 11, Islamophobia appears to become more pronounced, including violent attacks on Muslims.

3.2 Antiracism and ‘Anti-antiracism’

There have been some attempts to realise antiracist practices and policies in education or the social services, which received support from some local authorities in the 1980s, (notably in London). Such policies, were however often limited to issues of representation and culture. As they often focused on promoting minority cultures, they were seen by many whites as undermining their identity, a perception that was reinforced by media and politicians. Often, these antiracist practices failed to take on board white majority populations as active participants. Such antiracist practices remained marginal, being promoted by individuals or small groups in institutions, only. Despite this marginality of these antiracist approaches, the New Right used these as examples for constructing a new logic according to which the ethnic majority are being victimised by overzealous, misguided antiracists. This lead to a backlash against anti-racist practices. This argument is however not specific to the British context, it is an important discursive construction to invert real power relations and portray the ethnic majority as victimised through ethnic minorities.

Political Blackness and the subject of anti-racism

In the 1970s, African-Caribbean, African and Asian people claimed the notion of Blackness as a unifying subject position that stressed the common experiences of colonialism and post-colonial racism. The self-organisation of black people under a unified banner was seen as crucial in challenging the pathologising gaze of race relations thinking and an ‘exotic’ multiculturalism. Instead of focusing on cultural differences and trying to explain racism through the cultural looking glass, this movement and its theorists emphasised structural inequalities, including the particular formations of race and class in post-colonial Britain. Black was claimed as a political subjectivity that restored post-colonial migrants’ agency in anti-racist and other social struggles. This move was intended to counter the divisive notion that viewed African Caribbeans as having ‘not enough culture’ to successfully integrate and Asians as having ‘too much culture’ to successfully integrate (Alexander 2002). Black antiracist movements however, also became to some extent incorporated into the multiculturalist system and the state’s allocation of resources became a source of competition that fostered claims for difference (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992) Thus, in the late 1980s theorists such as Modood claimed that the concept of political Blackness masked differences and inequalities between African- Caribbean and Asian populations, he campaigned for a notion of ‘black and asian’ in order to recognize these different positionings and needs (Modood *)**.** While this account was also contested by Asian theorists and activists (e.g. Brah 1992*****), by the new millennium the political category of Blackness is becoming very much marginalized. In the academic debates, this has been superseded by an interest in fluid identities, hybrid, diasporic and new ethnicities. Assessing the developments in academic thinking, Claire Alexander (2002) claims that the notion of black has increasingly become co-terminus with African-Caribbean identities, which are seen as fluid, hybrid and at the same time linked to African American identities in the global market place, catering

for a cross-over audience and claiming inclusion into Britishness. Asian identities, on the other hand, have become reified as culturally static, immutable and essentialist. This has gone hand in hand with a rise in the racialization of the Muslim. She claims that recent academic debates have presented African Caribbean communities as capable of integration, particularly through the commodification of difference, 'moving towards inclusion in and similarity with a reimagined Britishness' (2002: 566) while the culture of Asian populations is increasingly cast as unassimilably different and an obstacle to inclusion.

The construction of racialized groups is flexible and dynamic. As Stuart Hall assesses, at the beginning of the new millennium there is an increasing contradiction between what he terms 'multicultural "drift" – the increasing visible presence of black and Asian people in all aspects of British social life as a natural and inevitable part of the "scene" – rather than an "alien wedge", to borrow Mrs. Thatchers' felicitous phrase…' (188) and persisting racialized inequalities. Large parts of the country are not affected by the growing multiculturalism. Instead, inequalities and racialized exclusion in employment, education and housing persists. At the same time, the ethnic minority population is increasingly diversifying and statistics reveal that there educational and economic achievement, as well as housing situation significantly differ across ethnic groups. Across all ethnic groups, it is asylum seekers who report most experiences of racism (ref* survey on attitudes CRE MORI). ADD

ADD: Anti-racist organisations – relations with unions, government response, etc.?

4. Workplace Discrimination

Black and ethnic minority workers in the UK, even those of the second or third generation, are still the victims of direct and indirect racial discrimination in employment as in other areas of life, although their experience of discrimination varies considerably depending on specific national and cultural origins. They suffer discrimination in many areas: protection under the law, participation in the labour market, recruitment, wages and working conditions, promotion, access to training and other benefits, access to pensions and other benefits after the end of the employment relationship. While the most obvious forms of direct discrimination have declined, indirect discrimination remains a serious problem for these workers, as confirmed by a recent governmental report (Cabinet Office 2003). They also suffer from the continued racialised segregation of the labour market and their own geographical concentration in areas of industrial decline and unemployment The problems faced by Britain's black and ethnic minority population are complex, and discrimination in employment is reinforced by disadvantages in housing, education, access to transport and other areas.. This section will explore these different forms of discrimination, as well as the reasons behind the persistence of discrimination.

4.1 Labour market segmentation

As a group, Black and ethnic minority Britons have a lower employment rate than Whites, and have lower than average wage levels, even under comparable circumstances. (Labour Force Survey 1994-2000, cited in Cabinet Office 2003). They do have a higher rate of self-employment; but this tends to be in fairly small-scale

businesses. Because of the heterogeneity of the Black and ethnic minority population, it is necessary to break down information regarding their experiences of the labour market by specific ethnic group, as well as gender.

Black and ethnic minority workers in employment tend to be concentrated in particular industries and types of jobs. This ethno-stratification affects men more than women, and certain ethnic groups more than others. For example, Afro-Caribbean men are over-represented in transport, engineering and distribution; Pakistani and Bangladeshi men in textiles and clothing and distribution; Indian men in these sectors and in health care. Ethnic minority women are over-represented in the public sector more generally, as well as in textiles and clothing (Wrench 1996: 28-29). One of the most serious problems for ethnic minority workers has been that many of the industries in which they are concentrated have been those most hit by economic decline, making them more vulnerable to unemployment (Mirza 1995).

Workers from Britain’s ethnic minorities, especially first generation Iraqi or Zimbabwean immigrants but also second and third generation Indian, Pakistani or Black Caribbean workers, experience major discrimination in first entering the labour market. Research in Scotland among 250 white and 250 ethnic minority employees reveals that a majority of both groups agreed with the statement that ‘employers can say what they like about equal opportunities, but the truth is that if you look or appear different to what is expected, then you won’t get offered the job’. This report suggests that ethnic minority workers are four times more likely not to apply for other jobs once they have been rejected a first time than are white workers (CRE 2000).

Overall, migrants perform worse than the UK-born in their levels of participation in the labour market, with lower employment and labour market participation rates and higher unemployment rates. There is also a racial divide within the migrant population: Migrants from ‘white’ ethnic backgrounds have as good or higher employment rates and wages than UK born whites. Ethnic minority migrants, though, are not rewarded as well as UK-born, including UK-born ethnic minorities, a finding that raises concern about the impact of knowledge of the labour market in shaping outcomes (Kempton 2002). The impact of migration on securing employment is also experienced racially. Employment probabilities for white migrants remain relatively stable over the course of migration and settlement. However, ethnic minority migrants experience initially substantially lower employment probabilities. Only after about 20 years of residence in the UK, do their participation and employment probabilities become closer to those of UK born whites (Kempton 2002).

In general, unemployment among both men and women from ethnic minority groups is much higher than for whites. Bangladeshi men in 2001-02 experienced four times higher unemployment (20 per cent) than white men, and all other groups except Indian men had unemployment rates between two and three times higher. Among young men aged under 25 the discrimination is greater than for older workers: for young white men unemployment was 12 per cent, but for young Black African men, Pakistanis and Black Caribbeans, it ranged between 25 per cent and 31 per cent, and up to over 40 per cent of young Bangladeshi men. Whilst women’s unemployment was lower as a whole than men’s, the differences between the white and non-white women’s unemployment rates were even larger than for the men. (White 2002).

It is important to note that even second- and third- generation ethnic minority workers, except for small groups such as Chinese men, Indian men and Caribbean women professionals, Black and ethnic minority workers continue to be disadvantaged in the labour market in relation to whites, despite their supposed advantages of having been brought up in the UK with English as a mother tongue. A recent government report reveals that the differentials between White and ethnic minority British workers in terms of employment levels, earnings, and access to higher-skilled jobs had actually increased by the 1990s (Cabinet Office 2003).

4.2 Educational and skill segmentation

The skill segmentation both within the ethnic minority population and between it and whites follows broadly similar lines to segmentation in the labour force. Historically, the first large wave of Black and ethnic minority immigrants, in the 1950s and 60s, tended to find work in semi-skilled and unskilled occupations, in the industrialised areas around greater London, the Midlands, and the North. Some were recruited in their home countries, for example Black Caribbean workers for London Transport (Brooks 1975) or nurses and other medical practitioners for the NHS; many others joined family members already in Britain, thus increasing their geographical concentration. More recent immigrants have followed more varied career paths, and a large number are skilled professionals (for example, medical or IT professionals from India). As in other areas, the education and skill profile of different ethnic groups varies considerably: 52 % of Bangladeshi men in Britain work in the restaurant industry, compared with only one percent of white men, while five percent of Indian men are medical practitioners (Cabinet Office 2003).

Differences in educational levels between Black and ethnic minority groups and whites provide a partial explanation of differences in levels of skill. Migrants and the children of migrants who do not speak English as a native language suffer clear disadvantages in schooling, and cultural and religious differences are often cited as contributing factors to lower educational performance as well (however this last point is highly controversial, and does not explain the higher performance of children from some ‘culturally different’ ethnic groups, or the continuing lower performance of Black Caribbean men, who are native English speakers). Overall, Blacks and ethnic minorities perform less well at school and fewer continue to higher education, some groups do very well indeed, particularly Indian pupils, who out-perform white pupils at upper secondary school level tests. In general, ethnic minority girls also out-perform boys.

The tendency for Black and ethnic minority pupils to perform less well at school than whites is closely related to the relatively lower levels of quality of life of ethnic minorities, and particularly to discrimination and segmentation in housing. Over two-thirds of all ethnic minorities in England live in that country’s 88 most deprived local authority districts, as opposed to 40 % of the general population (Cabinet Office 2003). The complex structure and funding of the school system in England and Wales (Scotland has a different and more egalitarian system) means that those who live in less-well off areas tend to have lower-quality schools that receive less funding. The tendency of Blacks and other ethnic minorities to live in inner cities and older industrialised areas is also an important factor in their access to employment. The feeling of hopelessness resulting from unemployment, poverty and social exclusion of

adults also naturally has an effect on their children, contributing to a ‘vicious circle’ for some ethnic minority groups.

Yet it is important to bear in mind that, even when levels education and skills are taken into account, Black and ethnic minority workers still perform less well than whites in terms of employment rates, earnings, promotions, and access to high-skilled jobs (Cabinet Office 2003). A recent large scale survey based on Labour Force Survey findings from 1985 to 1996 of young ethnic minority men (Caribbean, African, Indian, Pakistani-Bangladeshi) in the labour market found that even after controlling for relevant variables like education and age of migration, there were considerable differences in the pay outcomes for these ethnic groups. Although Caribbean men had similar qualification profile to white men, their earnings fell £81 a week (120 euros) below those of white men. Pakistani and Bangladeshi men’s earnings were about half those of white men, which can only in small part be explained by different educational achievements. Indians whose qualifications were slightly in advance of whites ‘reached within 1 percent of the latter’s performance in the labour market’. (Berthoud 2000: 412). However, Africans, whose educational records were marginally better than those of Indians still had similar earnings to Caribbeans.

Black and ethnic minority workers find it much more difficult to gain access to professional and managerial jobs, and promotion within an occupation is also more difficult for these groups. In a 1999 Employment Tribunal case, one of Britain’s major high street electrical goods’ retailers with a written ‘Equal Opportunities’ policy was found guilty of tolerating racial discrimination among its mid-level managers. Another Tribunal found that a white area manager had removed a highly-successful Asian store manager from a superstore in a largely minority area, because he 'felt able to do this as he works in a company which maintains a glass ceiling through which managers from ethnic minorities have only rarely in the past been able to break and above which there have not been any ethnic minority managers for some time'. Some specific groups have managed to achieve professional advancement, for example Black Caribbean women, who have a higher rate of employment as professionals and managers (16%) than white women (15%). This may be explained in part by their large concentration in the public sector, which has more effective equal opportunities policies than most of the private sector.

Recent research has indicated that ethnic minority workers are more likely to suffer difficulties in getting a new job because of inadequate references from their former employer. And, as a result of discrimination in pay throughout their employment, they also suffer from lower pensions, particularly if they came to the UK as adults.

4.3 Other forms of segmentation and discrimination

Employment law

An earlier section of this report examined the deficiencies of current UK anti-discrimination legislation. There is some confusion over definitions of racial discrimination (which groups are covered) and problems in the procedures for making complaints, especially in cases of indirect discrimination. Of the cases of racial discrimination that reach a Tribunal, there is only a success rate of 16%, compared to over 50% in sex discrimination cases. (K Monaghan, presentation to IER conference

on equality and diversity, 22.5.03). However, the provisions of the Race Relations Amendment Act 2000 create new positive duties on employers in the public sector, and the transposition into UK law of the EU Race Relations Directive will reverse the burden of proof in cases of racial discrimination.

The composition of the Black and ethnic minority population means that not all these workers enjoy the full protection of UK law. Undocumented workers have no employment rights, and even migrant workers employed legally have a lower level of protection under the law. Only those migrant workers who are working legally either as permanent residents with indefinite leave to remain in the country (the majority) or those with work permits, are protected by the same anti-discrimination legislation as other workers, including the Race Relations Act 1976 and specific measures such as the Equal Opportunities (Employment Legislation) (Territorial Limits) Regulations of 1999, transposing the EU Posted Workers Directive. However, even migrant workers who are in the UK legally are not always familiar with their rights under existing legislation, and the TUC and other bodies have revealed widespread abuses of employment law in sectors employing large numbers of foreign workers, such as catering and agriculture. Recent research gathered by the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants reports that 70 % of catering jobs in London are filled by migrants, many of them undocumented, many of whose employers ignore health and safety requirements and the basic provisions of employment law, including the minimum wage (TUC/JCWI: 7-8). The majority of today's migrant workers are in skilled occupations, such as health care and IT, but many of these are also the victims of discrimination, particularly those on work permits who are not allowed to change employer.

Health

Ethnic minority workers are more likely than whites to suffer from poor health. This in turn relates back to their labour market segmentation and to poor conditions of employment. Feeling under greater pressure to conform to the employer or manager's whims, evidence points to ethnic minority workers being more ready to work 'normal' working hours than are white workers. According to official statistics, ethnic minority people in Scotland are more likely than their white counterparts (25% compared to 16%) to work more than the contracted number of hours per week (Labour Force Survey 1998, 1999). Another important factor here is the concentration of housing in deprived inner-city areas, which also tend to have more limited health care facilities.

4.4 Explaining discrimination in employment and recent efforts to overcome it

Many of the reasons generally given for the problems faced by Black and ethnic minority workers in the labour force appear inadequate on the basis of the above analysis. With certain key exceptions (Indians and Chinese), members of ethnic minorities do have a lower level of education than whites, but the difference is small. The problem of racial discrimination in the UK is therefore largely one of discrimination against those with equivalent qualifications. Discrimination in recruitment is largely explained by the persistence of informal mechanisms of recruitment through family members of existing employees, as well as racial prejudice in the evaluation of personal characteristics of job applicants (Wrench 1986: 10-11). Similarly, discrimination once the worker is in the employment relationship is linked

to informal systems of promotion and lack of access to training and other benefits. In addition, discrimination in housing, access to education and health care, and the difficulty in overcoming the effects of past discrimination all play a role in the continuing disadvantages suffered by Black and ethnic minority workers.

As municipal authorities have a duty to ensure that their functions are carried out with due regard for good race relations, many have pursued a policy of ‘contract compliance’. This means that these local authorities support awarding contracts to firms that comply with minimum standards of employment practices, including equal opportunities. A study of London local authorities found that before the application of contract compliance requirements, only 18% of contractors had equal opportunities policies, while after the appearance of contract compliance units, it rose to 75% (Wrench 1996).

Under the 2000 Race Relations Amendment Act there is thus much greater pressure on public and private sector employers to draw up and implement equal opportunities policies. These policies should regulate discrimination in recruitment, promotion and training and should be regularly reviewed. Equal opportunities policies aim at making the recruitment, training and promotion processes fairer to all. They tend to be used more by large employers and public sector employers and research on earlier efforts in this area suggest little progress. Initially only a minority of employers had equal opportunities policies (CRE 1989), but even in those who do, equal opportunities policies are rarely implemented fully, including monitoring their effectiveness (only 4% of those employers implementing EOPs) (Wrench 1996). Moreover, despite the CRE’s code of practice recommending that employers should not use recruitment methods that give rise to indirect discrimination, such as word-of-mouth recruitment that tends to reproduce the ethnic composition of the existing workforce, some 19% of employers in one study continued to recruit by word-of-mouth.

A number of local authorities and some large employers have also adopted equality targets based on a review of the ethnic composition of the local labour market, to set targets for recruiting ethnic minority applicants. This policy includes attracting ethnic minority applicants, by targeted advertising and publicity. However, candidates are solely selected on the basis of their suitability for the job and it is unlawful to invoke ‘race’ as a selection criterion.

5. Trade Union Policies and Actions

The attitudes toward race and racism of British trade unions, trade union activists and members, and their work in representing the interests of black and ethnic minority members have varied considerably over the past century, ranging from an initial resistance to immigration and/or black labour, to the exclusion of ethnic minorities from union membership, to incorporation into the union on a ‘colour blind’ basis, and to the development of specific structures for black representation and partial autonomy (Wrench and Virdee 1995: 22). These different attitudes and practices have not undergone a strict linear progression, but have co-existed in different unions at the same time, within the same union at different levels at the same time, as well as within the same or different unions over time. Wrench and Virdee’s typology is related to the three choices posed by Penninx and Roosblad (200: 4) of whether to

resist or accept immigration; to exclude or include ethnic minority workers in trade union membership; and to practice ‘equal treatment’ through general union policies or develop special policies and programmes responsive to their needs. In the sections below we will show the changing responses of British trade unions to these questions since the post-war period.

5.1 Trade union structures in the UK

The UK was one of the first countries to develop a powerful trade union movement, in tandem with the rise of industrialism in the mid 19th century. Individual craft and industrial unions established the Trades Union Congress in 18**, and it remains the UK’s single national trade union centre. The trade unions’ role in setting up the Labour Party in the 1890s was another distinctive feature of the British experience, although in the 20th century to two have followed different, often conflictual paths (see part 2 above). From 1945 until the late 1970s, when union membership reached its peak, trade unions exerted considerable influence over employers and on government. Following the rise of Thatcher and of neo-liberalism, coinciding with the decline of Fordist production and the rise of ‘precarious’ forms of work, British unions have entered a period of decline, which is only now beginning to show signs of reversal. However, it is in this period of difficulty that unions have begun to take seriously the needs of Black and ethnic minority workers, and of women.

According to the autumn 2001 Labour Force Survey, British trade unions now have a national membership of 7.6 million. This represents just 29.1 per cent of all UK employees compared to the membership density peak of over 50% in 1979, before the Thatcher years. Trade unionists are now primarily found among professionals (48 per cent) and among public sector workers (59 per cent). They are much less likely to be found among private sector workers (19 per cent) or among sales and customer services staff (13 per cent). They are also much more likely to be employees with 20 or more years’ service (60 per cent) than they are to have under one year’s service (12 per cent) (Brook 2002). Many Black and ethnic minority workers are therefore less likely to be represented by unions than previously because they tend to be in occupations that have been hit by unemployment, privatisation and de-regulation, or because they are at lower levels within an occupational hierarchy and have less seniority. Certain sectors that employ disproportionately large number of ethnic minority workers, such as the health sector and the post office, are in the public sector and have trade union membership levels of around 80 per cent.

At a general level the very presence of a union acts to compress the wage differential and hence reduce unfair inequalities. Statistical evidence provided by a detailed analysis of the wage data from the Labour Force survey shows that non-white trade union members earn on average 8.4 per cent more than non-whites who are not members of unions. If no unions existed at all, the current wage differential between White and Black workers would increase by 1.4 per cent (Metcalf 2001). But this progressive outcome of the union presence is at a macro level - and largely reflects the presence of large numbers of non-white workers in lower paid but nonetheless public sector jobs. It is not necessarily an intended outcome of union activities.

5.2 Historical background: From Overt Exclusion to ‘Colour Blind’ Policies

Black and ethnic minority workers have historically been more likely than white workers to join trade unions in Britain (Wrench 2000: 134). This difference is particularly marked among black women, and is only partially explained by the tendency of Black workers to be employed in highly unionised sectors (Sneade 2001: 437). Those black workers who migrated from the Caribbean and other former British colonies to the UK often had positive experiences or expectations of trade unionism, in part through the involvement of the TUC in setting up and assisting trade unions in their native countries (Wrench 1986: 2). Many such workers came to the UK from politically active communities, and continued their tradition of activism in the new country. The links between trade unions and community and other forms of social organisations are particularly strong among ethnic minorities. However, today there are noticeable differences in union membership between different minority groups, with black (Afro-Caribbean or African) workers the most likely and Pakistani and Bangladeshi workers the least likely to be union members (Sneade 2001).

Despite the propensity of black and ethnic minority workers to join trade unions, their experience within British trade unions has been fraught with difficulties and disappointments. Unions in different sectors and over different periods have demonstrated contradictory and sometimes hostile responses to the demands of black and ethnic minority workers and indifference to the discrimination against them (Fletcher 1999; Mirza 1995; Wrench 1986). In the immediate post-war period, which saw the arrival of substantial numbers of immigrants from the Caribbean and the Indian Sub-Continent, the TUC did not oppose immigration on racial grounds but did express concern over the ‘integration’ of immigrants from the Commonwealth (Wrench 2000: 135). During this period, the unions did not actively seek to intervene to oppose the racist behaviour or attitudes of white members, and white trade unionists tended to hold the same racial prejudices as the white population as a whole. There were several cases of white union members and low-level officials supporting quotas for black and ethnic minority workers in the workforce, suspending the 'last in first out' rule when it came to black workers, and agreeing to the segregation of black workers into specific jobs (Mirza 1995: 27; Miles, 1982: 187; Wrench 1986). In 1948, the assistant general secretary of the National Union of Seamen stated that British ports would be a ‘no go’ area for black seafarers, and in 1955, white bus drivers in West Bromwich and Wolverhamptom took industrial action to oppose the recruitment of Afro-Caribbean immigrants (Wrench 1986: 6). Sometimes local trade union activists adhered to such policies in opposition to the official national policy of their union. For example, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, while the national policy of the British health workers’ trade union COHSE was to welcome immigrant nurses recruited from the West Indies and Nigeria, several local branches vigorously opposed such recruitment (Carpenter 1988; Bentley 1976, quoted in Wrench 2000).

From the 1960s onwards, the black and ethnic minority population became more settled and many of these workers began to play a larger role within the trade unions and other social organisations in the country many of them increasingly had come to see as their own. Ethnic minority workers launched a number of high-profile union organising drives and strikes in the 1960s and 1970s, sometimes in opposition to white union members and even the white leadership. Among these disputes, the best known are probably those at Coneygre Foundry in 1967-8, where Indian workers were chosen for redundancy despite greater seniority than some white workers; Mansfield Hosiery in 1972, when Asian workers struck over their exclusion from the best-paying

jobs at the plant; and Imperial Typewriters in 1974, when black workers went on strike over discrimination in the payment of bonuses (Mirza 1995: 28-29; Wrench 1986: 6-8). In many of these cases, white local officials and members either failed to offer practical support to striking black workers, or even opposed them, sometimes in collusion with employers. In one famous case, a white union official observed that he did not understand why ethnic minority members were protesting his union's indifference: 'We look after them as well as our own people'. (check source!) A more positive outcome was achieved by the solidarity of black and white trade unionists during the Grunwick dispute of 1976-77, in which the largely Asian female workforce won the support of broad sectors of the British trade union movement in a fight for union recognition (Wrench 1986: 20).

By the early 1970s, the TUC and many individual unions had begun to counter the racist behaviour and attitudes within their own ranks, as seen in these and other disputes, The 1970s was characterised by a 'colour blind' approach that marked the first step in opposing racism and toward recognition of the special needs of black workers, as seen in a 1970 statement by the TUC general secretary, Vic Feather, that 'the trade union movement is concerned with a man or woman as a worker. The colour of a man's skin has no relevance whatever to his work' (quoted in Wrench 1986: 5). The TUC and some individual unions started to develop educational and training materials on equal opportunities, and in 1979 the TUC called on its affiliates to adopt a policy on racism. (Wrench 2003: ms.) However, in these early days action against racism and race discrimination was still notable by its absence. In 1974, a House of Commons Select Committee complained that '…the record of the TUC is similar to that of the CBI (the employers' organisation) in that both organisations have declared their opposition to racial discrimination, but have taken wholly inadequate steps to ensure that their members work effectively to eradicate it.' (quoted in Wrench 1986: 9).

5.3 Trade union policies from the 1970s onwards

By the late 1970s, the increase in disputes involving black and ethnic minority workers, the growing awareness among white union members and officials of the discrimination faced by black and ethnic minority workers, the general concern on the left over the rise of racist organisations like the National Front, and other factors encouraged further evolution in the attitudes and positions of the TUC and its affiliates. The TUC abandoned its previous opposition to race relations legislation, and in 1977 the TUC Congress called for a campaign against racism within the trade union movement (Wrench 1986: 14; Wrench 2000: 138). In 1981, the TUC adopted its charter "Black Workers: A TUC Charter for Equality of Opportunity", calling on its affiliates to encourage greater participation of black and ethnic minority workers within their ranks through the creation of advisory committees, special education programmes and recruitment drives, and urging them to include discrimination issues in their collective bargaining agendas and to take vigorous action in defence of employment grievances involving racial harassment or discrimination (Mirza 1995: 29).

As more and more white unionists began to recognise that black and ethnic minority members faced special problems in society and in employment, the trade union movement began to move from 'colour blind' policies towards the acceptance of

special measures against discrimination and in favour of black and ethnic minority participation. There was strong pressure from the rank and file, as many local union branches became more involved in local anti-racist and anti-fascist groups and community organisations, which was key to the success of the Grunwick dispute. These years were also marked by the beginning of the decline of traditional unionised industries, and the propensity of black and ethnic minority workers to join and become active in unions became especially attractive to unions that were now in search of members and activists. The rise of the women's movement and the creation of separate organisations for women led to a growing acceptance of similar organisations for black workers.

Over the 1980s, more and more national unions carried out the provisions of the TUC Black Workers' Charter (which was re-issued in 88) by creating special structures to handle race discrimination and to encourage Black participation. The National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO, now part of UNISON) set up a National Working Party on Race Equality in 1984, partly in response to the efforts of Black members to organise in the London borough of Camden (Wrench 1986: 18). The first national unions to designate an officer responsible for race equality issues were the National Union of Public Employees (NUPE, now part of UNISON) in 1986, and the Transport and General Workers' Union (TGWU) in 1989 (Wrench 2003). A survey of the leading unions in 1988 showed that half had set up structures to tackle the problems of racial discrimination and black participation in the union; in 1993, a similar survey indicated that this figure had gone up to two-thirds (Wrench 2000: 139; Wrench 2003).

Table to be added after publication of TUC report – mid September 2003

As the TUC and leading affiliates adopted better policies on race discrimination over this period, it became increasingly clear that these policies were not always applied, and that Black workers were dissatisfied with their representation by and role within the unions. The 1988 survey referred to above showed little change in the numbers of Black union officials, and few new measures around the problem of racial discrimination (Wrench 2000: 139). This highlighted one of the main limitations of democratic organisations: the difficulty in representing minority interests within structures based on the decision of the majority. The dissatisfaction of many Black unionists led to the separate 'self organisation' of Black and ethnic minority workers within the major national unions, a move that initially aroused great antagonism among many white trade unionists and some Black unionists as well. (Wrench 2000: 141-142). Some Black unionists supported totally separate organisations, such as the long-standing Indian Workers' Associations (IWA), but this was a minority viewpoint (Wrench and Virdee 1995: 22-24). More commonly, Black and ethnic minority unionists supported separate Black members' organisations within existing unions, like the Camden Black Workers group mentioned above. From its foundation in 1990, UNISON, the public sector union formed out of the merger of NALGO, NUPE, and the Confederation of Health Sector Employees (COHSE), adopted an innovative programme of 'self organisation' of Black and ethnic minority members, along with women, gay and Lesbian, and disabled members. The new union (now the largest in the UK) created special structures targeting ethnic minority workers, with special reserved seats, a special formal committee, a conference and a dedicated national union officer, The TUC itself initiated annual Black workers' conferences (check

date), which have given voice to the concerns of Black and ethnic minority workers and given support to their organising initiatives within individual unions (Wrench 2000: 142-143).

5.4 Recent trends in trade union actions and policies

By the late 1990s, the British trade union movement as a whole had moved to the acceptance of Black and ethnic minority workers, the encouragement of their participation and their 'partial autonomy' within the unions, and the development of special measures and structures to assure the defence of their interests and their full representation within the union movement. This new positive attitude toward black and ethnic minority participation in trade unions culminated in the election of Bill Morris, who came to the UK from Jamaica as a child, as deputy general secretary (in 1986) then as general secretary (in 1991) of Britain's largest union, the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU). In his capacity as general secretary of the T&G, and as a recent president of the TUC, Morris played a leading role in opposing racism against refugees and asylum seekers, and in persuading the government to abandon a voucher system for the basic subsistence of asylum seekers. In 2001, the TUC modified its rules to require all affiliates to carry out a regular 'Equal Opportunities Audit', a measure that would give 'teeth' to the organisation's commitment to race equality, in the view of the TUC Black Worker's Officer, Roger McKenzie (interview, 2002 – check exact date).

In the wake of the racist murder of the Black teenager Stephen Lawrence in 1993, and the publication of the Macpherson Report on institutional racism, in 1999 the TUC set up the Stephen Lawrence Task Group with the aim of identifying and eradicating racism within the trade union movement. Most of the largest British unions are members of the task group, and have adopted official policies opposed to discrimination at the workplace and calling for the increased participation of black and ethnic minority workers within the unions. It is very unclear, however, to what extent these national policies have been carried through to the local and workplace levels, and to what extent black and ethnic minority workers now feel that their trade unions truly represent them in their struggle against discrimination. Further, the positive developments within the trade union movement are being called into question by the general decline in trade union influence and membership, and the passage of anti-union employment legislation by the Conservative governments of 1979 – 1997, much of which has not yet been revoked by the current Labour government.

The unbalanced distribution of union members and the effect of anti-union employment legislation often makes it difficult for the unions to respond to discrimination at work: in many of the sectors where ethnic minority and immigrant workers find jobs there are already very few union members. This, however, could be viewed as providing the unions with an even stronger incentive to take up the issues of discrimination faced by ethnic minority workers so as to try and recruit significantly. Yet the historic pattern of higher rates of union membership among Black and ethnic minority workers has now changed to an approximate equality for non-white and white women (28 per cent of both), and to a higher density (30 per cent) among white male workers than among non-white men (25 per cent) (Brook 2002).

The evidence suggests that despite the presence of many racial discrimination grievances, unions rarely take an initiative in dealing with them. A survey of Scottish employers in 2000, for example, found that while 82% of employers had an equal opportunities policy in place, this was largely the result of their desire to be considered 'forward looking' and to minimise the risks of being involved in an industrial tribunal. Only one-third reported that their policy had been influenced by trade union pressure (CRE 2000). Furthermore, the loss of resources and members has led many unions to behave 'defensively' and to reduce activities that are considered by the leadership to have a low chance of success– including the defence of individual members in race discrimination cases.

Two recent cases of the representation of Black workers' interest by leading unions show the difficulties for unions, even with the best of intentions, to win gains for their Black members in an unfavourable legal and industrial relations climate. John Wrench and Satnam Virdee (1995) carried out case studies of union organising drives among contract cleaners at Heathrow Airport, and of the strike of 'sweated' workers at the Burnsall metal company in Smethwick (West Midlands). In the first case, the TGWU was prevented by restrictive employment legislation and employer hostility from organising the mainly Asian women workers on Airport premises, and over a two year period only managed to increase the membership of the branch from 6 to 50, still only 5 % of the potential membership (Wrench and Virdee 1995: 10-11). In the second case, although the GMB supported the strike by 26 Asian women workers over poor health and safety conditions and low pay, in over a year they were unable to win a successful conclusion to the strike (Ibid. 17-20). In both cases, the lack of ethnic minority union officers who spoke the same language as the workers was considered a key factor in the difficulties the unions faced, but the unions did not have the resources, at least immediately, to remedy the problem. Both unions sought to develop broader 'community' campaigns and adopt other innovative forms of organising, but this strategy created tensions and led to the loss of union control over the dispute, particularly in the Burnsall case. However, in both cases the main problems were external and had to do with the specific situation of the workers in vulnerable forms of 'poor work' and the enormous difficulties for unions in organising and representing them. (add source on poor work)

Another study, by Steve Jefferys (2002), focuses on the problems faced by a leading union in the private sector, UNIFI, and the difficulties in applying national level race equality policies to the local level. The largest bank workers' union has 125,000 members, of whom just 1.8% are Asian and 1.1% are Black, and has developed a thoughtful and clear anti-racist policy. It has worked against racial discrimination in recruitment, promotion, access to training, remuneration and other benefits, as well as racial harassment, and its general secretary, Ed Sweeney, was a member of *Stephen Lawrence Task Group*. Unifi has a National Equal Rights Committee to develop anti-racist policies; and has carried out ethnic monitoring of its membership. Yet even among the *Unifi* activists the impact of these new policies at the top of the union appears to be quite small. Not one, for example, out of 86 activists at its 2002 conference reported race discrimination as one of the top five grievances members' raise with them; and only seven out of 81 activists suggested they needed training on racial discrimination (Jefferys 2002). The impact of anti-racist policies among the union's ethnic minority members and among the 62 per cent of finance sector who are not union members at all is likely to be still smaller. (Brook 2002). This is confirmed

by the Scottish employee research where only 2% of the ethnic minority workers indicated that if they experienced discrimination they would turn first to their union - fewer even than who would report it to the police (CRE 2000).

5.5 Conclusion

Over the past half century, the British trade union movement has clearly moved from policies of racist exclusion, toward acceptance of Black and ethnic minority workers and members within the unions, to the active defence of their interests, first through 'colour blind' general union policies and more recently, through special equality structures and 'partial autonomy'. However, just as these policies have moved to fruition, the economic and political setting has made it increasingly difficult for unions to carry out their responsibilities toward Black and ethnic minority members, and fewer Black and ethnic minority workers are now in trade union membership. The reality for Britain's ethnic minority workers is that the trade union movement is now, albeit belatedly, responding in terms of its structures to the evidence of continued discrimination. However, in an era in which racial minorities are being increasingly targeted by the national press and extreme right political parties, a great deal more needs to be done in terms of defending the ethnic minority population as a whole, through increased alliances with community-based groups, and through more thorough implementation of equality policies throughout every level of the union and within society.

(3,746)

6. Appendices

Definitions relating to racism and racial discrimination [27]:

Race: 'Race' is a socially constructed category, denoting membership or belonging to a group on the basis of common origin or destiny. Inclusion or exclusion on the basis of 'race' are often justified through phenotypical or presumed biological difference. The claims of scientific racism that there is a correspondence of individual's phenotypical, genetic and social characteristics have been totally discredited.

Racialisation,: Racialisation means the social process by which a group is discursively and materially constructed as a 'race'. The discursive construction of 'race' increasingly uses a language that implies immutable cultural differences and the incompatibility of different cultures rather than biological differences.

Ethnicity: Ethnicity is a category of belonging. Common origin or destiny, cultural practices, religion, language are often used as signifiers for inclusion or exclusion from an ethnic group. Ethnic resources, such as language, culture, economic or territorial resources can be used individually or as a group in relation to other groups for struggle or negotiation. The same group can be constructed (by its own members or externally) at

[27] The following definitions are just a very brief sketch, I relied heavily on Anthias, Floya andYuval-Davis, Nira 1992: Racialized Boundaries. Race, nation, gender, colour and class and the anti-racist struggle. London: Routledge.

varying times and in different situations as an ethnic, national, racial or religious group (e.g. the Jews).[28]

Both national and ethnic projects construct and maintain a collectivity. These collectivities claim to be based on common origin, culture, territory or destiny. Barth (1969) has made the point that ethnic groups are defined by their boundaries and not so much by the cultural contents. He argues that although the contents of a culture changes, the group holding this culture regards itself as continuous. And although in some cases cultural differences within one group are just as, or even more significant as the cultural differences to another group, the boundaries continue to be constructed along ethnic lines. These boundaries, however, are not a given. These boundaries may be flexible and shifting, still they remain constitutive for the collectivity.

Racism: By racism I mean discourses and practices which exclude, inferiorise and subordinate people who are constructed as a 'race' or ethnic group. Racism is the discursive and material practice of excluding and subordinating members of a group on the grounds of cultural or assumed biological difference. Racism does not need to rely on an assumed racial difference and inferiority but can also be based on the assumption that a group is undesirable and needs to be assimilated, excluded or exterminated (e.g. Islamophobia, racism directed at refugees in the UK). Racism crucially relies on power relations with reference to economic resources, access and control of the state, and supra-state and transnational power relations.

Actions and structures are racist, if their effect is to exclude disproportionately members of subordinate ethnic groups (e.g. because of residence requirements, geographical location, etc.), even if there is no racist intentionality.

Markers and signifiers of difference are crucial for the constructions of boundaries in racist discourses and practices. It can be colour, language, culture, religion, and the way these are seen as expression of a degree of 'civilisation'. At times even democracy and the practice of women's rights are used as markers of difference to justify racist exclusions.

Xenophobia: Xenophobia is the dislike of strangers, the crucial difference with racism is that racism involves power relations. Members of socially powerless groups can have racist views or xenophobic attitudes, however as they do not have the social power to put them into practice, these need to be viewed differently from racism by members of dominant groups.

Statistical Information

Ethnic Minority Population

In 2001/02 the size of the ethnic minority population was 4.5mio, that is 7.5% of the UK population. Indians are the largest group of ethnic minorities (21.7%), followed

[28] Anthias and Yuval-Davis (1992) argue that the most significant difference between ethnic and national groups is that the latter claim or struggle for a separate political representation. Although usually only ethnic minorities are assumed to have 'ethnicity' I think it important to call attention to the fact that majority and dominant groups in a nation state have an ethnicity, too.

by Pakistanis (16.7%), Black Caribbeans (13.6%) Black Africans (12 %), Mixed ethnic background (11%), Bangladeshis (6.1%) and Chinese (4.2%) (White 2002). (Office of National Statistics 2002)

These figures refer to ethnic group, [29] and include the British born, who make up a significant proportion - between 89% (Black Other) and 25% (Chinese) - of the ethnic minorities. The migrant population, that is foreign born individuals, including whites makes up 8% of UK population that is 4.8 mio people. Although there is overlap with the ethnic minority population, the migrant population is more diverse: 23% from the EU and not subject to immigration controls, 20% are from the Indian subcontinent, 19% from Africa and 11% from America.

Migrant Population
The migrant population of foreign-born individuals that includes whites makes up 8% of the UK population or 4.8 million people. Although there is an overlap with the ethnic minority population - 47% of migrants have acquired British citizenship - the migrant population is more diverse: 23% come from the EU and are not subject to immigration controls, 20% are from the Indian subcontinent, 19% from Africa and 11% from America. Nearly half (47%) of migrants living in the UK have acquired British citizenship. Nearly one third of all migrants arrived in the last decade, particularly from Eastern Europe. The current stock of migrants is more diverse than before the 1980s, although it still reflects the post-colonial migrations of the 1960s and 1970s. (Kempton 2002)

Housing
The settled black and ethnic minority population is spread across the country, but is concentrated in largely urban areas of the Midlands and in London. The migrant worker population is overwhelmingly based in London and the South East. More than 40% of migrants live in London, making up 26% of London's population (Kempton 2002). (*include map ethnic minority and labour market report p. 22) Household sizes for ethnic minorities vary. Black Caribbean and Other Black households are about the same size as white households at 2.3 people each. Asian households tend to be larger, with Bangladeshi households the largest at 4.7 people, followed by Pakistani (4.2 people) and Indians (3.3) people (White 2002). While the majority among all ethnic groups are owner-occupiers, the figures for 1991 vary between ethnic groups: Indians at 82% have the largest proportion of owner-occupiers, followed by Pakistanis (76%), whites (66%), Chinese (62%). The groups with the lowest proportion of owner-occupiers are Black Africans (28%), Bangladeshis (44%) and Black Caribbeans (48%).

These indicators should be considered together with the quality and size of the housing. Thus, while less then 0.5% of white households live in overcrowded conditions (i.e. more than 1.5 persons per room), among Bangladeshi households this is 19% and among Pakistani households 8%. These two groups also have the highest rate of households without central heating - 34% of Pakistani and 24% of Bangladeshi households (Wilson, n.d.) Lone parents were also found disproportionately often

[29] The data is complex. The UK now has two sources of data on migrants and ethnic minorities. Since 1991 self-declaration questions on ethnicity have been included in the Census and other surveys, although with limited options that do not differentiate between many different white ethnic minorities. At the same time the statistics continue to provide data on country of birth.

among certain ethnic minority groups: 61% of families with dependent children where the head was a person of Mixed origin and 54% of families where the head was a Black Caribbean person. Asians (9% of Indians, 15% of Pakistanis) were least likely to live in lone parent families, while among whites 23% lived in lone parent families (ONS 2002).

Education

The education picture is not only differentiated in terms of ethnicity but also in terms of gender. Thus, across all ethnic groups, girls outperformed boys in GCSEs (an examination normally taken at 16 years old). In 2002, 66% of Indian girls, 55% of white girls, 54% of Indian boys, 46% of black girls and 45% of white boys passed five or more at grade C or higher. However only 37% of Pakistani and Bangladeshi girls, 31% of Black boys and 22% of Pakistani/ Bangladeshi boys achieved the same results. Black pupils were more likely to be permanently excluded from school than any other ethnic group (38 in every ten thousand for Black Caribbeans), with boys being more affected than girls in all ethnic groups (White 2002).

Minority ethnic groups have a higher propensity to stay in education after the end of compulsory education at 16 than whites, again with gender differences. In 1991, 12% of White women and 15% of white men had higher education qualifications, as opposed to 13% of ethnic minority women and 18% of ethnic minority men. Among Black Africans, 31% of men and 22% of women had university degrees, among Chinese, 28% of men and 24% of women, among Indians, 19% of men and 11% of women had degrees. While in most ethnic groups, men tended to have larger proportions of higher education degrees, among African Caribbeans, women were twice as likely to have degrees than men (12% as compared to 6%) (CRE 1997).

Despite some ethnic groups' propensity to have higher qualifications than whites, some ethnic groups were most likely to be unqualified: in 2001/02, 48% of Bangladeshi women and 40% of Bangladeshi men had no qualifications. Among Pakistanis, 40% of women and 27% of men had no higher education qualifications.

Low-income households
People from ethnic minority groups are more likely to live in low income households, this is particularly striking for Bangladeshis, almost 60% of whom live in low-income households. Half of African-Caribbeans (49%) also lived in low income households in 2000/01, while the white population was least (16%) likely to live in low-income households (ONS 2002).

Employment Patterns

***Tables to be added*

Trade union membership and participation

*** Data to be added.*

Attitudes to Race, Identity, Nationality

According to a 2002 MORI study, 78% of the population agree that it is important to respect the rights of minorities and 27% think more should be done to learn about different ethnic groups' cultures. At the same time, however, there is a strong consensus of 69% of the population and 51% of the ethnic minority population that ethnic minorities need to show a real commitment to be considered British. This means that 77% of white and 76% of ethnic minority communities believe that immigrants should be made to learn English. At the same time, there appears to be an emerging cross-racial consensus, 86% disagree that you have to be white to be British.

Both the general public (45%) and ethnic minority (57%) populations identify strongly with their local area and with Britain (45% of the general population and 42% of the ethnic minority population). However there are differences in identifying with a national entity: while 39% of the general public identify with England, Wales or Scotland, only 9% of the ethnic minority population do. In contrast, 46% of the ethnic minority population identify with the country of their family's origin.

Among all groups, there is a feeling that there are too many immigrants in Britain, 61% of the overall population agree with this statement and 46% of ethnic minority groups. This fits in with the fact that among all ethnicities, asylum seekers and refugees are most likely to be discriminated against (60%).

Respondents to another survey (CRE 1998) think that racial discrimination is most likely to occurr at the workplace (42%) or when getting job interviews (28%) followed by contacts with police or courts (13%), education (7%) or as a customer in a shop (5%). Statistics on racially motivated offences are difficult to gauge because they are often underreported and the police do not always note the racial motivation of a crime. The CRE (1999) factsheet on racially motivated crime relied on police records and the British Crime Survey, providing estimates of levels of crime and trends in crime. Since 1994, the BCS also asks white groups if they have experienced racially motivated crime. In 1995, only 1 % of whites thought that race was a motive in one or more offences committed against them, as opposed to 4% of Blacks, 5% of Indians and 8 % of Pakistanis. The 1996 BCS estimated that in 1995 2% of offences (382 000) were considered by the victims to be racially motivated. 101 000 were against Asians and 42 000 against black people. This makes up 15% of offences committed against Asian and Black people. An estimated 238 000 or 1% of offences against white people are thought to be racially motivated. Low levels of racial harassment are a serious problem, with 1 % of white, 7% of black, 8 % of Indian and 12 % of Pakistani/ Bangladeshi people reporting it to the 1994 and 1996 BCS. Fear of racial violence is particularly significant for Pakistanis (18%). Racially motivated incidents are more likely to be detected (66%) than non-racially motivated incidents (26%). However, offenders in racially motivated incidents are less likely to be charged (39%) than offenders in other incidents (56%). 54% of Indians, 54% of Pakistanis and 62% of Caribbeans were dissatisfied with the police response to their case.

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